Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control Monetary Policy by Athanasios Orphanides et al.
115
iMPerfect knowledge and the Pitfalls 
of oPtiMal control Monetary Policy
Athanasios Orphanides 
Central Bank of Cyprus
John C. Williams
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
Sixty years ago, Milton Friedman questioned the usefulness of the 
optimal control approach because of policymakers’ imperfect knowledge 
of the economy and favored instead a simple rule approach to monetary 
policy (1947, 1948). These are still live issues, despite the development of 
powerful techniques to derive and analyze optimal control policies, which 
central banks use in their large-scale models (see Svensson and Woodford, 
2003; Woodford, 2003; Giannoni and Woodford, 2005; Svensson and 
Tetlow, 2005). Although the optimal control approach provides valuable 
insights, it also presents problems. In particular, because it assumes a 
single correctly specified reference model, it ignores important sources of 
uncertainty about the economy that monetary policymakers face. Robust 
control methods of the type analyzed by Hansen and Sargent (2007) 
extend the standard optimal control approach to allow for unspecified 
model uncertainty; however, these methods are designed for relatively 
modest deviations from the reference model.1 In practice, policymakers 
1. Svensson and Williams (2007) propose a method to compute optimal policy under 
model uncertainty using a Markov-switching framework. Computing optimal policies 
under model uncertainty with this method is extremely computationally intensive, and 
its application to real-world problems remains infeasible.
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are concerned with more fundamental sources of model uncertainty, 
and the robustness of monetary policy strategies to uncertainty is 
generally viewed as important (McCallum, 1988; Taylor, 1993). Thus, 
a key question is whether our understanding of the macroeconomic 
environment has improved enough to make the optimal control approach 
to monetary policy preferable to well-designed simple rules.
Relatively little research to date explores the robustness properties 
of optimal control policies to moderate or large degrees of model 
misspecification.2 Gianonni and Woodford (2005) show that optimal 
control policies are robust to misspecification of the shock processes as 
long as the central bank forecasts are optimal. In contrast, Levin and 
Williams (2003) show that optimal control policies can perform very 
poorly if the structural equations of the central bank’s reference model 
are badly misspecified. Orphanides and Williams (2008) examine 
the robustness of optimal control policies if the reference model 
misspecifies the way private agents form expectations. That paper 
finds that if private agents are uncertain of the true model and form 
expectations based on an estimated forecasting model, then optimal 
control policies designed under the assumption of rational expectations 
can perform poorly. The paper also shows that optimal control policies 
can be made more robust to this type of model uncertainty by placing 
less weight on stabilizing economic activity and interest rates in the 
central bank objective used in deriving the optimal control policy.
This paper extends the analysis in Orphanides and Williams 
(2008) to include uncertainty about the natural rates of interest and 
unemployment. We allow for exogenous time variation in the natural 
rates of interest and unemployment that the central bank may measure 
with error. There is considerable evidence of significant time variation 
in these natural rates and the difficulties of their real-time estimation 
(see, for example, Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997; Laubach, 2001; 
Orphanides and Williams, 2002; Laubach and Williams, 2003).3 We 
assume that the central bank has a good understanding of the process 
describing the evolution of these natural rates, but may not observe 
2. In contrast, there has been considerable research on the robustness of simple 
monetary policy rules to model uncertainty, including Taylor (1999), Levin, Wieland, 
and Williams (1999, 2003), Orphanides and Williams (2002, 2007), and Brock, Durlauf, 
and West (2007).
3. The natural rate of output is prone to considerable real-time mismeasurement, 
causing problems for monetary policy similar to the mismeasurement of the natural 
rate of unemployment, as discussed in Orphanides and others (2000), Orphanides and 
van Norden (2002), and Cukierman and Lippi (2005).117 Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control
them directly, in which case it must estimate the natural rates using 
available data. We consider both the case in which the central bank 
uses the optimal statistical filter—the Kalman filter in the model 
of this paper—to estimate the natural rates, and the case in which 
the central bank’s estimate of the key gain parameter of the filter is 
misspecified. Laubach and Williams (2003) and Clark and Kozicki 
(2005) document the imprecision in estimates of the gain parameter 
in the Kalman filter, making uncertainty about this key parameter a 
real-world problem for central bank estimates of natural rates.
We find that the optimal control policy derived assuming rational 
expectations and known natural rates performs relatively poorly in 
our estimated model of the U.S. economy when agents have imperfect 
knowledge of the structure of the economy, but instead must learn and 
the central bank must estimate movements in natural rates. The key 
shortcoming of the optimal control policy derived under the assumption 
of perfect knowledge is that it is overly fine-tuned to the assumptions 
in the benchmark model. As a result, the optimal control policy works 
extremely well when private and central bank knowledge are perfect. 
When agents learn, however, and the central bank may make mistakes 
due to misperceptions of natural rates, expectations can deviate from 
those implied under perfect knowledge, and the finely-tuned optimal 
control policy can go awry. In particular, by implicitly assuming that 
inflation expectations are always well anchored, the optimal control 
policy responds insufficiently strongly to movements in inflation, 
which results in excessive variability of inflation.
We then seek to construct policies that take advantage of the 
optimal control approach, but are robust to the forms of imperfect 
knowledge that we study.4 Specifically, following the approach in 
Orphanides and Williams (2008), we look for weights in the central 
bank objective function such that an optimal control policy derived 
using these “biased” weights performs well under imperfect knowledge 
about the structure of the economy. We find that optimal policies 
derived assuming much lower weights on stabilizing economic activity 
and interest rates than in the true central bank objective perform 
well in the presence of both private agent learning and natural rate 
uncertainty. Relative to our earlier results, the incorporation of natural 
4. An alternative approach, followed by Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006), is to derive 
optimal monetary policy under learning. Because the model with learning is nonlinear, 
they apply dynamic programming techniques that are infeasible for the type of models 
studied in this paper and used in central banks for monetary policy analysis.118 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
rate uncertainty further reduces the optimal weights on economic 
activity and interest rates in the objective function used in deriving 
optimal policies that are robust to imperfect knowledge.
Finally, we compare the performance of optimal control policies to 
two types of simple monetary policy rules that have been found to be 
robust to various types of model uncertainty in the literature. The first 
is a forward-looking version of a Taylor-type policy rule, similar to the 
rule that Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) found to perform very 
well in a number of estimated rational expectations models of the U.S. 
economy. The second is the rule proposed by Orphanides and Williams 
(2007), which differs from the first rule in that policy responds to the 
change in the measure of economic activity, rather than the level. This 
type of rule has been shown to be robust to mismeasurement of natural 
rates in the economy (Orphanides and Williams, 2002, 2007) and to 
perform very well in a counterfactual analysis of monetary policy in 
1996–2003 (Tetlow, 2006). Under rational expectations, these rules 
perform somewhat worse than the optimal control policy.
The two simple monetary policy rules perform very well under 
learning and with natural rate mismeasurement. These rules clearly 
outperform the optimal control policy when knowledge is imperfect 
and generally perform about as well as the optimal control policies 
derived to be robust to imperfect knowledge by using a biased objective 
function. The relatively small advantage that the optimal control 
policy has over these robust rules when the model is correctly specified 
implies that the “insurance” payment required to gain the sizable 
robustness benefits found here is quite small.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 
describes the model and its estimation. Section 2 describes the central 
bank objective and the optimal control policy. Section 3 describes the 
models of expectation formation and the simulation methods. Section 4 
examines the performance of the optimal control policy under imperfect 
knowledge. Section 5 analyzes the optimal weights in the central bank 
objective that yield robust optimal control policies that perform well 
under imperfect knowledge. Section 6 compares the performance of 
the simple rules to optimal control policies. Section 7 concludes.
1. an esTiMaTed Model of The U.s. eConoMy
Our analysis is conducted using an estimated quarterly model 
of the U.S. economy. The basic structure of the model is the same as 
in Orphanides and Williams (2008), but it is extended to incorporate 119 Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control
time variation in the natural rates of interest and unemployment. The 
model consists of equations that describe the dynamic behavior of the 
unemployment rate and the inflation rate and equations describing 
the natural rates of interest and unemployment and the shocks. To 
close the model, the short-term interest rate is set by the central bank, 
as described in the next section.
1.1 The Model
The IS curve equation is motivated by the Euler equation for 
consumption with adjustment costs or habit: 
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We specify the IS equation in terms of the unemployment rate 
rather than output to facilitate the estimation of the equation 
using real-time data. This equation relates the unemployment 
rate, ut, to the unemployment rate expected in the next period, 
one lag of the unemployment rate, and the difference between 
the expected ex ante real interest rate (equal to the difference 
between the nominal short-term interest rate, it, and the expected 
inflation rate in the following period, πt+1) and the natural rate of 
interest, rt
*. The unemployment rate is subject to a shock, vt, that 
is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), process 
with innovation variance σev
2 . The AR(1) specification for the shocks 
is based on the evidence of serial correlation in the residuals of the 
estimated unemployment equation, as discussed below.
The Phillips curve equation is motivated by the New-Keynesian 
Phillips curve with indexation: 
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It relates inflation, πt, (measured as the annualized percent change in 
the GNP or GDP price index, depending on the period) during quarter 
t to lagged inflation, expected future inflation, denoted by πt
e
+1, and 
the difference between the unemployment rate, ut, and the natural 120 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
rate of unemployment, ut
*, in the current quarter. The parameter φπ 
measures the importance of expected inflation on the determination 
of inflation, while (1 – φπ) captures the effects of inflation indexation. 




We model the low-frequency behavior of the natural rates of 
unemployment and interest as exogenous AR(1) processes independent 
of all other variables: 
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We assume these processes are stationary based on the finding using 
the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test that one can 
reject the null of nonstationarity of both the unemployment rate and 
real federal funds rate over 1950–2003 at the 5 percent level. The 
unconditional mean values of the natural rates are irrelevant to the 
policy analysis, so we set them both to zero.5
1.2 Model Estimation and Calibration
The details of the estimation method for the inflation and 
unemployment rate equations are described in Orphanides and 
Williams (2008). The estimation results are reported below, with 
standard errors indicated in parentheses.
Unrestricted estimation of the IS curve equation yields a point 
estimate for φu of 0.39, with a standard error of 0.15. This estimate 
is below the lower bound of 0.5 implied by theory; however, the 
null hypothesis of a value of 0.5 is not rejected by the data.6 We 
therefore impose φu = 0.5 in estimating the remaining parameters of 
5. Because we ignore the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, as well as any 
other potential source of nonlinear behavior in the structural model, the unconditional 
means of variables are irrelevant. Inclusion of the zero bound would severely complicate 
the analysis and is left for future work.
6. This finding is consistent with the results reported by Giannoni and Woodford 
(2005), who find, in a similar model, that the corresponding coefficient is constrained 
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the equation. The estimated equation also includes a constant term 
(not shown) that provides an estimate of the natural real interest 
rate, which is assumed to be constant for the purpose of estimating 
this equation.
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Unrestricted estimation of the Phillips curve equation yields a point 
estimate for φπ of 0.51, just barely above the lower bound implied by 
theory.7 For symmetry with our treatment of the IS curve, we impose 
φπ = 0.5 and estimate the remaining parameters using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). The estimated residuals for this equation show no signs 
of serial correlation in the price equation (Durbin-Watson = 2.09), 
consistent with the assumption of the model.
There is considerable uncertainty regarding the magnitude 
and persistence of low-frequency fluctuations in the natural rates 
of unemployment and interest (see Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 
1997; Laubach, 2001; Orphanides and Williams, 2002; Laubach and 
Williams, 2003; Clark and Kozicki, 2005.) We do not estimate a model 
of natural rates; instead, we calibrate the parameters of the AR(1) 
processes based on estimates found elsewhere in the literature. To 





*, to 0.99. In our benchmark 
calibration, we set the innovation standard deviation of the natural 
rate of unemployment to 0.07 and that of the natural rate of interest 
to 0.085. These values imply an unconditional standard deviation 
of the natural rate of unemployment (interest) of 0.50 (0.60), in the 
low end of the range of standard deviations of smoothed estimates of 
these natural rates suggested by various estimation methods. We also 
consider an alternative calibration in which the standard deviations 
of the natural rate innovations are twice as large, consistent with the 
upper end of the range of estimates of natural rate variation.
7. For comparison, Giannoni and Woodford (2005) find that the corresponding 
coefficient is constrained to be at its theoretical lower bound of 0.5.122 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
2. opTiMal ConTrol MoneTary poliCy
In this section, we describe the optimal control monetary policy. 
The policy instrument is the nominal short-term interest rate. We 
assume that the central bank observes all variables from previous 
periods when making the current-period policy decision. We further 
assume that the central bank has access to a commitment technology; 
that is, we study policy under commitment.
The central bank’s objective is to minimize a loss equal to the 
weighted sum of the unconditional variances of the inflation rate, the 
difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate of 
unemployment, and the first-difference of the nominal federal funds 
rate: 
L = var(π − π*) + λ var(u − u*) + ν var(∆(i)),  (9)
where var(x) denotes the unconditional variance of variable x. We 
assume an inflation target of zero percent. As a benchmark for 
our analysis, we assume λ = 4 and ν = 1. Based on an Okun’s Law 
relationship, the variance of the unemployment gap is about one-
quarter that of the output gap, so this choice of λ corresponds to equal 
weights on inflation and output gap variability.
The optimal control monetary policy is that which minimizes 
the loss subject to the equations describing the economy. We 
construct the optimal control policy, as is typical in the literature, 
assuming that the policymaker knows the true parameters of the 
structural model and assumes all agents use rational expectations 
and the central bank knows the natural rates of unemployment 
and interest.8 For the optimal control policy, as well as the simple 
monetary policy rules described below, we use lagged information 
in the determination of the interest rate, reflecting the lag in data 
releases. The optimal control policy is described by a set of equations 
representing the first-order optimality condition for policy and the 
behavior of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints 
on the optimization problem implied by the structural equations of 
the model economy.
Because we are interested in describing the setting of interest 
rates in a potentially misspecified model, it is useful to represent the 
8. See, for example, Sargent’s (2007) description of the optimal policy approach.123 Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control
optimal control policy in an equation that relates the policy instrument 
to macroeconomic variables, rather than in terms of Lagrange 
multipliers that depend on the model. There are infinitely many such 
representations. In the following, we focus on one representation of 
the optimal control (OC) policy. In the OC policy, the current interest 
rate depends on three lags of the following variables: the inflation rate, 
the difference between the unemployment rate and the central bank’s 
estimate of the natural rate of unemployment, and the difference 
between the nominal interest rate and the estimate of the natural 
rate of interest. The OC representation yields a determinate rational 
expectations equilibrium. We find that including three lags of these 
variables is sufficient to very closely mimic the optimal control outcome 
assuming the central bank observes natural rates.
2.1 Central Bank Estimation of Natural Rates
As noted above, we compute the OC policy assuming the central 
bank observes the true values of the natural rates of interest and 
unemployment. In our policy evaluation exercises, we consider the 
possibility that the central bank must estimate natural rates in real 
time. In such cases, we assume that the central bank knows the true 
structure of the model, including the model parameters (and the 
unconditional means of the natural rates), and observes all other 
variables including private forecasts, but does not observe the shocks 
directly. Given our model, the Kalman filter is the optimal method for 
estimating the natural rates, and we assume that the central bank 
uses the appropriate specification of the Kalman filters to estimate 
natural rates. These assumptions represent a best case for the central 
bank with respect to its ability to estimate natural rates. In other 
work, we examine the implications of model uncertainty regarding 
the data-generating processes for natural rates (Orphanides and 
Williams, 2005, 2007).
The central bank’s real-time estimate of the natural rate of 
unemployment,  ˆ
* ut, is given by 
ˆˆ ,
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where a1 and a2 are the Kalman gain parameters and the term 
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which incorporates the effects of the transitory inflation disturbance 
and the deviation of the natural rate of unemployment from its 
unconditional mean, scaled in units of the unemployment rate. The 
central bank only observes this surprise and not the decomposition 
into its two components.
The central bank estimate of the natural rate of interest, ˆ
* rt , is 
given by 
ˆˆ
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where the first term in parentheses is the current-period unemployment 
rate shock and the final term is the lagged shock. The final term 
appears in the equation due to the assumption of an AR(1) process 
for the shocks to the unemployment rate equation.
The optimal values of the gain parameters depend on the variances 
of the four shocks. In our policy evaluation exercises, we consider 
alternative assumptions regarding the parameter values that the 
central bank uses in implementing the Kalman filters. In one case, we 
assume that the central bank uses the optimal values implied by the 
variances in our baseline calibration of the model. These values are as 
follows: a1 = 0.982, a2 = 0.008, b1 = 0.987, b2 = 0.006, and b3 = –0.003. 
As noted above, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the 
values of the gain parameters, and real-world estimates tend to be 
very imprecise. We therefore examine two cases in which the central 
bank uses incorrect gain parameters. In one, the central bank assumes 
that the natural rates are constant, so the gain parameters are zero. 
In the other, we assume that the central bank uses the appropriate 
gain parameters for our baseline model calibration, but in fact the 
standard deviations of the natural rate shocks are twice as large as 
in the baseline calibration.
3. expeCTaTions and siMUlaTion MeThods
As noted above, we are interested in studying the performance 
of the optimal control monetary policy derived under a misspecified 
model of expectations formation. We assume that private agents and, 
in some cases, the central bank, form expectations using an estimated 
reduced-form forecasting model. Specifically, following Orphanides 
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learning, that is, they reestimate their forecasting model using a 
constant-gain least squares algorithm that weights recent data more 
heavily than past data.9 This approach to modeling learning allows 
for the possible presence of time variation in the economy, including 
the natural rates of interest and unemployment. It also implies that 
agents’ estimates are always subject to sampling variation, in that 
the estimates do not eventually converge to fixed values.
We assume that private agents forecast inflation, the unemployment 
rate, and the short-term interest rate using an unrestricted vector 
autoregression model (VAR) containing three lags of these three 
variables and a constant. We further assume that private agents 
do not observe or estimate the natural rates of unemployment and 
interest directly in forming expectations. The effects of time variation 
in natural rates on forecasts are reflected in the forecasting VAR by the 
lags of the interest rate, inflation rate, and unemployment rate. First, 
variants of VARs are commonly used in real-world macroeconomic 
forecasting, making this a reasonable choice on realism grounds. 
Second, the rational expectations equilibrium of our model with known 
natural rates is very well approximated by a VAR of this form. As 
discussed in Orphanides and Williams (2008), this VAR forecasting 
model provides accurate forecasts in model simulations.
At the end of each period, agents update their estimates of their 
forecasting model using data through the current period. To fix 
notation, let Yt denote the 1 × 3 vector consisting of the inflation 
rate, the unemployment rate, and the interest rate, each measured 
at time t: Yt = (πt, ut, it). Let Xt be the 10 × 1 vector of regressors in 
the forecast model: Xt = (1, πt–1, ut–1, it–1, …, πt–3, ut–3, it–3). Let ct be 
the 10 × 3 vector of coefficients of the forecasting model. Using data 
through period t, the coefficients of the forecasting model can be 
written in recursive form: 
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where κ is the gain. Agents construct the multi-period forecasts that 
appear in the inflation and unemployment equations in the model 
using the estimated VAR.
9. See Sargent (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2002), and Evans and Honkapohja 
(2001) for related treatments of learning.126 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
For some specifications of the VAR, the matrix Rt may not be 
full rank. To circumvent this problem, in each period of the model 
simulations, we check the rank of Rt. If it is less than full rank, we 
assume that agents apply a standard Ridge regression (Hoerl and 
Kennard, 1970), where Rt is replaced by Rt + 0.00001* I(10), where 
I(10) is a 10 × 10 identity matrix. 
3.1 Calibrating the Learning Rate
A key parameter in the learning model is the private agent 
updating parameter, κ. Estimates of this parameter tend to be 
imprecise and sensitive to model specification, but they generally lie 
between 0.00 and 0.04.10 We take 0.02 to be a reasonable benchmark 
value for κ, a value that implies that the mean age of the weighted 
sample is about the same as for standard least squares with a sample 
of twenty-five years. Given the uncertainty about this parameter, 
we report results for values of κ between 0.01 (equivalent in mean 
sample age to a sample of about fifty years) and 0.03 (equivalent in 
mean sample age to a sample of about sixteen years).
3.2 Simulation Methods
In the case of rational expectations with constant and known 
natural rates, we compute model unconditional moments numerically 
as described in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999). In the case of 
learning, we compute approximations of the unconditional moments 
using stochastic simulations of the model.
For the stochastic simulations, we initialize all model variables to 
their respective steady-state values, which we assume to be zero. The 
initial conditions of C and R are set to the steady-state values implied 
by the forecasting perceived law of motion (PLM) in the rational 
expectations equilibrium with known natural rates. Each period, 
innovations are generated from independent Gaussian distributions 
with variances reported above. The private agent’s forecasting model 
is updated each period and a new set of forecasts computed, as are 
the central bank’s natural rate estimates. We simulate the model for 
44,000 periods and discard the first 4,000 periods to eliminate the 
effects of initial conditions. We compute the unconditional moments 
from the remaining 40,000 periods (10,000 years) of simulated data.
10. See Sheridan (2003), Orphanides and Williams (2005), Branch and Evans 
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Learning introduces nonlinear dynamics into the model that may 
cause the model to display explosive behavior in a simulation. In 
simulations where the model is beginning to display signs of explosive 
behavior, we follow Marcet and Sargent (1989) and stipulate 
modifications to the model that curtail the explosive behavior. One 
potential source of explosive behavior is that the forecasting model 
itself may become explosive. We take the view that in practice private 
forecasters reject explosive models. Therefore, in each period of the 
simulation, we compute the maximum root of the forecasting VAR 
(excluding the constants). If this root falls below the critical value 
of 1, the forecast model is updated as described above; if not, we 
assume that the forecast model is not updated and the matrices C 
and R are held at their respective values from the previous period.11 
This constraint is encountered relatively rarely with the policies 
analyzed in this paper.
This constraint on the forecasting model is insufficient to ensure 
that the model economy does not exhibit explosive behavior in all 
simulations. We therefore impose a second condition that eliminates 
explosive behavior. In particular, the inflation rate, the nominal interest 
rate, and the unemployment gap are not allowed to exceed (in absolute 
value) six times their respective unconditional standard deviations 
(computed under the assumption of rational expectations and known 
natural rates) from their respective steady-state values. This constraint 
on the model is invoked extremely rarely in the simulations.
4. perforManCe of The opTiMal ConTrol poliCy
In this section, we examine the performance of the optimal control 
policy derived under the assumption of rational expectations and 
known natural rates to deviations from this reference model. We start 
by considering the case in which private agents learn and natural rates 
are known by the central bank. We then turn to the case of natural 
rate uncertainty.
4.1 Known Natural Rates
The OC policy, derived for  λ = 4 and ν = 1, is given by the following 
equation: 
11. We chose this critical value so that the test would have a small effect on model 
simulation behavior while eliminating explosive behavior in the forecasting model.128 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
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The first line of table 1 reports the outcomes for the OC policy under 
rational expectations and known natural rates. These outcomes serve 
as a benchmark against which the results under imperfect knowledge 
can be compared. The OC policy is characterized by a high degree 
of policy inertia, as measured by the sum of the coefficients on the 
lagged interest rates of 0.89. The sum of the coefficients on lagged 
inflation equals 0.25 and that on the lagged differences between 
the unemployment rates equals –0.89. As discussed in Orphanides 
and Williams (2008), the optimal control policy is characterized 
by a muted interest rate response to deviations of inflation from 
target. Following a shock to inflation, the OC policy only gradually 
brings inflation back to target and thus restrains the magnitude of 
deviations of unemployment from its natural rate and that of changes 
in the interest rate.
Table 1. Performance of Alternative Monetary Policies 
under Rational Expectations and Known Natural Ratesa
Standard deviation Loss
Policy π u – u* ∆i L
Optimal control 1.83 0.68 1.20 6.64
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) 1.87 0.70 1.24 6.98
Orphanides and Williams (2008) 1.83 0.73 1.39 7.45
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The policies are derived for λ = 4 and  ν = 1. 
Macroeconomic performance under the OC policy deteriorates 
under private agent learning, with the magnitude in fluctuations in 
all three objective variables increasing in the updating rate, κ. The 
upper panel of table 2 reports the results when private agents learn 
assuming constant natural rates. These results are very similar to 
those reported in Orphanides and Williams (2008), where natural 
rates are assumed to be constant and known. Thus, the incorporation 
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implications for the design of optimal monetary policy under imperfect 
knowledge. With learning, agents are never certain of the structure 
of the economy or the behavior of the central bank. As discussed 
in Orphanides and Williams (2005), particularly large shocks or 
a “bad run” of one-sided shocks can be misinterpreted by agents 
as reflecting a monetary policy regime that places less weight on 
inflation stabilization or has a different long-run inflation target 
than is actually the case. This confusion adds persistent noise to the 
economy, which worsens macroeconomic performance relative to the 
rational expectations benchmark.
Table 2. Performance of OC Policy under Learning and 
Time-Varying Natural Ratesa
Standard deviation Loss
 κ π u – u* ∆i L
Known natural rates
0.01 2.28 0.80 1.33 9.52
0.02 2.77 0.93 1.55 13.59
0.03 3.23 1.09 1.80 18.46
Natural rate estimates with optimal Kalman filters 
0.01 2.26 0.88 1.33 9.99
0.02 3.16 1.10 1.82 17.79
0.03 3.59 1.23 1.99 22.94
Natural rates assumed constant
0.01 2.81 0.92 1.44 13.39
0.02 3.68 1.12 1.82 21.89
0.03 4.11 1.25 2.09 27.53
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The policies are derived for λ = 4 and ν = 1. 
4.2 Estimated Natural Rates
We now analyze the performance of the OC policy designed 
assuming rational expectations and known natural rates when 
private agents learn and natural rates are not directly observable. 
The middle section of table 2 reports the results assuming that 
the central bank uses the optimal Kalman filters to estimate both 
natural rates. As noted above, this case assumes that the central 130 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
bank has precise knowledge of the structure of the IS and Phillips 
curve equations, observes private expectations that appear in those 
equations, and knows the covariance matrix of the shocks (which is 
used in determining the coefficients of the Kalman filter).
If expectations are close to the rational expectations benchmark 
and the central bank efficiently estimates natural rates, then natural 
rate uncertainty by itself has little additional effect on macroeconomic 
performance under the OC policy. For example, in the case of κ = 0.01, 
the standard deviations of inflation and the first difference of interest 
rates are about the same whether natural rates are known or optimally 
estimated. Not surprisingly, the standard deviation of the difference 
between the unemployment rate and its natural rate is somewhat 
higher if natural rates are not directly observed, since in that case 
the central bank will sometimes aim for the “wrong” unemployment 
rate target. These errors do not spill over into increased variability 
of other variables, however.
If the learning rate is 0.02 or above, the interaction of natural rate 
misperceptions and learning leads to a much greater deterioration of 
macroeconomic performance. Natural rate misperceptions introduce 
serially correlated errors into monetary policy. When agents are 
learning, these policy errors interfere with the public’s understanding of 
the monetary policy rule. As a result, the variability of all three target 
variables increases. If the central bank uses the incorrect gains in the 
Kalman filters, macroeconomic performance worsens even further. The 
effects of using the wrong Kalman gains are illustrated in the lower 
panel of table 1. In this example, the central bank incorrectly assumes 
Kalman gains of zero in estimating natural rates (that is, it assumes that 
the variances of the shocks to the natural rates are zero). The resulting 
outcomes under the OC policy are significantly worse for all three 
learning rates shown in the table. The deterioration in performance 
is primarily due to a rise in the variability of inflation. Evidently, the 
combination of private agent learning and policy mistakes associated 
with poor measurement of natural rates significantly worsens the 
anchoring of inflation expectations and the stabilization of inflation.
5. robUsT opTiMal ConTrol poliCies
The preceding analysis shows that the optimal control policy 
derived under rational expectations and known natural rates may 
not be robust to imperfect knowledge. We now consider an approach 
to deriving policies that take advantage of the optimal control 131 Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control
methodology but are robust to imperfect knowledge. Specifically, 
following Orphanides and Williams (2008), we search for the “biased” 
central bank loss function for which the implied OC policy derived with 
rational expectations and known natural rates performs best under 
imperfect knowledge for the true social loss function. This approach 
applies existing methods of computing optimal policies under rational 
expectations and is therefore feasible in practice.
For a given value of κ and assumptions regarding natural rates 
and natural rate measurement, we search for the values of  λ and  ν 
such that the OC policy derived using the loss, 
   L u u i =− +− + var( )v ar() var( ( )),
* * ππ λ ν ∆
minimizes the true social loss, which we assume to be given by the 
benchmark values of λ = 4 and ν = 1.12 We use a grid search to find 
the optimal weights (up to one decimal place) for the biased central 
bank loss and refer to the resulting policy as the robust optimal control 
(ROC) policy.
5.1 Known Natural Rates
With known natural rates, the optimal weights for the central bank 
loss on unemployment and interest rate variability are significantly 
smaller than the true weights in the social loss, and this downward 
bias is increasing in the learning rate κ. The results from this exercise 
are reported in the upper panel of table 3, which considers the same set 
of assumptions regarding natural rate measurement as in table 2. For 
comparison, the losses under the OC policy, denoted L*, are reported in 
the final column of the table. The results with known natural rates are 
similar to that in Orphanides and Williams (2008), where natural rates 
are assumed to be constant. The presence of learning makes it optimal to 
assign the central bank a loss that places much greater relative weight 
on inflation stabilization than the true social loss—that is, to employ a 
conservative central banker, in the terminology of Rogoff (1985).13 The 
ROC policies yield significantly lower losses than the OC policy.
12. This approach can be generalized to allow the inclusion of additional variables 
in the loss function. We leave this to future research.
13. Orphanides and Williams (2005), using a very simple theoretical model, 
similarly find that a central bank loss function biased toward stabilizing inflation 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.133 Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control
5.2 Estimated Natural Rates
With estimated natural rates, the optimal weights for the central 
bank loss on unemployment and interest rate variability are generally 
smaller than in the case of known natural rates. Thus, the combination 
of learning and natural rate mismeasurement strengthens the case for 
placing much greater relative weight on inflation stabilization than 
the true social loss. For example, in the case of κ = 0.02 and optimally 
estimated natural rates, the optimal central bank objective weights 
are about one-half as large as in the case of known natural rates. In 
that case, the ROC policy for κ = 0.02 and optimally estimated natural 
rates is given by the following equation: 
ii ri ri r t t t t t t t =− −− −− + −− −− −− 11 1 0 12 01 5 0 11 21 31 .( ˆ ). ( ˆ ). ( ˆ )
* * * . .
...( ˆ ). ( ˆ
*
51
02 80 00 33 2 2 40
1




t t tt tt uu uu
−







.( ˆ ). uu tt  
(15)
This ROC policy is characterized by a much larger direct response 
to the inflation rate than the OC policy derived for the benchmark 
loss (and reported in equation 14), reflecting the greater relative 
weight on inflation stabilization for the biased central bank loss. 
The ROC policy responds somewhat more to lags of the difference 
between the unemployment rate and the perceived natural rate of 
interest, with a sum of coefficients of –1.35 (versus –0.89 in the OC 
policy). It also exhibits less intrinsic policy inertia, with the sum of 
the coefficients on the lagged interest rate of 0.84 (versus 0.89 in 
the OC policy), reflecting the much smaller weight on interest rate 
variability underlying the ROC policy.
When the central bank incorrectly assumes that natural rates 
are constant, the optimal weights for the central bank loss on 
unemployment and on interest rate variability are at most one-fifth 
as large as the true values. The differences in the losses under the OC 
and ROC policies are much larger than in the case of known natural 
rates. The central bank loss under imperfect knowledge tends to 
be relatively insensitive to small differences in the weights used in 
deriving the robust optimal policies. As a result, the precise choice of 
optimal weights is not crucial. What is crucial is that the weights on 
unemployment and the change in interest rates are small relative to 
the weight on inflation.134 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
5.3 Greater Natural Rate Variability
Thus far, we have assumed a relatively low degree of natural 
rate variability. We now explore the implications of more variable 
natural rates, consistent with some estimates in the literature.14 In 
the following discussion, we assume that the standard deviation of 
the natural rate innovations is twice that assumed in our benchmark 
calibration. The results for these experiments are reported in table 
4. The final column of the table reports the loss, denoted L*, under 
the standard OC policy derived assuming rational expectations and 
known natural rates with the benchmark calibration of innovation 
variances.
If the central bank is assumed to observe the true values of the 
natural rates, then the greater degree of natural rate variability does 
not significantly affect the optimal choices of weights in the objective 
function used to derive the ROC policy. Comparing the upper panels of 
tables 3 and 4 shows that the optimal values of  λ and  ν are similar for 
the two calibrations of natural rate variability. The losses associated 
with the OC policy are much larger when natural rates are more 
variable. In contrast, the losses under the appropriate ROC policies 
are not that different in the two cases.
If, however, the central bank underestimates the degree of 
natural rate variability in estimating natural rates, the optimal 
values of  λ and  ν are very small, implying that the central bank 
should focus almost entirely on inflation stabilization in deriving 
optimal control policies. The lower panel of the table reports 
outcomes for the case in which the central bank uses the Kalman 
filter gains appropriate for the benchmark calibration of natural 
rate variability, but in fact the natural rates are twice as variable (in 
terms of standard deviations). In this case, the OC policy performs 
very badly, and the benefits of following the ROC policy rather than 
the OC are dramatic.
6. siMple rUles
We now compare the performance of two alternative monetary 
policies that have been recommended in the literature for being robust 
to various forms of model uncertainty to the optimal control policies 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.136 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
analyzed above. The first rule is a version of the forecast-based policy 
rule proposed by Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003). According to 
this rule, the short-term interest rate is determined as follows: 
ii uu tt t
e
ut t =+ −+ − − + −− 1 3 11 θπ πθ π() ( ˆ ),
* *   (16)
where πt
e
+3 is the forecast of the four-quarter change in the price 
level and u* is the natural rate of unemployment which we take to 
be constant and known. Because this policy rule characterizes policy 
in terms of the first difference of the interest rate, it does not rely on 
estimates of the natural rate of interest, as does the standard Taylor 
rule (1993). The second rule we consider is proposed by Orphanides 
and Williams (2007) for its robustness properties in the face of natural 
rate uncertainty: 
ii uu tt t
e
ut t =+ −+ − − + −− 1 3 12 θπ πθ π() () .
*
∆   (17)
A key feature of this policy is the absence of any measures of natural 
rates in the determination of policy.15
We choose the parameters of these simple rules to minimize the 
loss under rational expectations and constant natural rates using 
a hill-climbing routine.16 The resulting optimized Levin-Wieland-
Williams rule is given by 
ii uu tt t
e
tt =+ −− − − + −− 1 3 11 10 5 1 39 .( ). ( ˆ ).
* * ππ
  (18)
The optimized Orphanides-Williams rule is given by 
ii uu tt t
e
tt =+ −− − − + −− 1 3 12 17 4 1 19 .( ). () .
* ππ
  (19)
15. This policy rule is related to the elastic price standard proposed by Hall (1984), 
whereby the central bank aims to maintain a stipulated relationship between the 
forecast of the unemployment rate and the price level. It is also closely related to the 
first difference of a modified Taylor-type policy rule in which the forecast of the price 
level is substituted for the forecast of the inflation rate.
16. If we allow for time-varying natural rates that are known by all agents, the 
optimized parameters of the Levin-Wieland-Williams and Orphanides-Williams rules 
under rational expectations are nearly unchanged. The relative performance of the 
different policies is also unaffected.137 Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control
In the following, we refer to these specific parameterizations of these 
two rules simply as the Levin-Wieland-Williams and Orphanides-
Williams rules.17
The lower part of table 1 reports the outcomes for the Levin-
Wieland-Williams rule and the Orphanides-Williams rule under 
rational expectations and known natural rates. Under rational 
expectations and known natural rates, the OC policy yields a modestly 
lower loss than the Levin-Wieland-Williams and Orphanides-Williams 
rules, which is consistent with the findings in Williams (2003) and 
Levin and Williams (2003) about the relative performance of simple 
rules for other models.
In contrast to the OC policy, the Levin-Wieland-Williams and 
Orphanides-Williams rules perform very well under imperfect 
knowledge. Table 5 compares the performance of these rules to that 
of the OC policy derived under the true central bank loss and the ROC 
policies. (Because the Orphanides-Williams rule does not respond to 
natural rate estimates, outcomes are invariant to the assumption 
regarding central bank natural rate estimation.) In all cases reported 
in the table, the Levin-Wieland-Williams rule performs as well as or 
better than the OC policy, with the performance advantage larger the 
higher the learning rate and the greater the degree of natural rate 
misperceptions. As discussed in detail in Orphanides and Williams 
(2008), the Levin-Wieland-Williams rule consistently brings inflation 
back to target quickly following a shock to inflation, and it contains 
the response of inflation to the unemployment shock. The Orphanides-
Williams rule does even better than the Levin-Wieland-Williams 
rule at containing the inflation responses to shocks, but at the cost of 
greater variability in the difference between the unemployment rate 
and its natural rate and the change in the interest rate. Consequently, 
the Levin-Wieland-Williams rule performs somewhat better than the 
Orphanides-Williams rule in terms of the stipulated central bank loss 
for all the cases that we consider here.
The outcomes under the Levin-Wieland-Williams and Orphanides-
Williams rules are generally similar to those under the ROC policies. 
The first column of table 5 reports the losses under the ROC policies 
(repeated from table 3). The Levin-Wieland-Williams rule does slightly 
worse than the ROC policy in the cases closest to the perfect knowledge 
benchmark (that is, a low κ and modest natural rate misperceptions) 
and performs better as the degree of model misspecification increases. 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.139 Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control
The Orphanides-Williams policy performs about the same or slightly 
worse than the ROC policies, except in the case of known natural 
rates, when the ROC policy performs much better. Evidently, the 
extra fine-tuning in the ROC policy compared to the simple rules 
is of little value in an environment characterized by learning and 
natural rate misperceptions. The results are qualitatively similar 
with greater natural rate variability, as seen in table 6. In this case, 
however, if the central bank uses the Kalman gains based on the 
benchmark calibration, the Orphanides-Williams rule outperforms 
the ROC policies.
The  strong  performance  of  the  Levin-Wieland-Williams 
and Orphanides-Williams rules in the presence of natural rate 
mismeasurement reflects the fact that these rules do not rely 
on natural rate estimates as much as the OC policy. Indeed, the 
Orphanides-Williams rule does not respond to natural rates at all, 
while the Levin-Wieland-Williams rule responds only to estimates of 
the natural rate of unemployment. Importantly, these rules respond 
aggressively to movements in inflation. In the case of the Levin-
Wieland-Williams rule, policy errors stemming from misperceptions 
of the natural rate of unemployment cause some deterioration in 
macroeconomic performance, but the consequences of these errors are 
limited by the countervailing effect of the strong response to resulting 
deviations of inflation from target.
7. ConClUsion
Current methods of deriving optimal control policies ignore 
important sources of model uncertainty. This paper has examined 
the robustness of optimal control policies to uncertainty regarding the 
formation of expectations and natural rates and analyzed monetary 
policy strategies designed to be robust to these sources of imperfect 
knowledge. Our analysis shows that standard approaches to optimal 
policy yield policies that are not robust to imperfect knowledge. More 
positively, this analysis helps us identify and highlight key features 
of policies that are robust to these sources of model uncertainty.
The main finding is that a reorientation of policy toward stabilizing 
inflation relative to economic activity and interest rates is crucial for 
good economic performance in the presence of imperfect knowledge. 
Indeed, focusing on price stability in this manner is the policy that 
should be pursued even when the central bank cares greatly about 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 141 Imperfect Knowledge and the Pitfalls of Optimal Control
policies that place greater weight on economic stability may appear 
desirable in an environment of perfect knowledge, doing so is 
counterproductive and leads to greater instability when knowledge 
is imperfect. Moreover, in an environment of imperfect knowledge, 
well-designed robust simple rules perform about as well as optimal 
control policies designed to be robust to imperfect knowledge. This 
raises further doubts about the wisdom of relying on the optimal 
control approach in lieu of simple rules for policy design. Given the 
many other sources of model uncertainty, further research should 
be directed at analyzing robust monetary policy with a full array of 
sources of model uncertainty.142 Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
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